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Foreclosure Equity Stripping:
Legal Theories and Strategies
to Attack a Growing Problem
By Prentiss Cox

oreclosure equity stripping is the classic case of kicking someone who is down.
The person perpetrating the equity strip-let's call this person the "acquirer"targets homeowners who are in foreclosure and have equity remaining in the
property. Promising to "save" the home for the desperate homeowner, the acquirer
offers refinancing or other assistance to "stop the foreclosure." For too many foreclosed homeowners, these promises end when the acquirer or the acquirer's confederates gain title to the property and take the homeowner's equity.

Prentiss Cox
Associate Clinical Professor of Law
University of Minnesota School of Law
190N Mondale Hall
229 19th Ave. S.
Minneapolis, MN 55455
612.625,5515
coxxx211@umn.edu

This scenario is occurring frequently across the country as home prices have soared
in almost every market, creating substantial equity in homes and fodder for an industry that preys on homeowners who are unable to pay their mortgages. For many of
these homeowners, foreclosure equity stripping completes the cycle started by
predatory lending tactics and undermines low-income homeowners' only grasp on
economic security.
In this article I offer advocates for foreclosed homeowners an analysis of legal theories and strategies to consider when confronting foreclosure equity stripping. I discuss the genesis of the problem and the different forms that foreclosure equity stripping takes (I). I focus on three legal theories that lawyers representing victims
commonly use (II). And I catalog and briefly describe other statutory and commonlaw theories to consider in these cases (III).
I. Foreclosure Equity-Stripping Scams
Skyrocketing housing prices and high foreclosure levels, accompanied by growth in
the subprime lending market, have exacerbated the foreclosure equity -stripping
problem. Scams generally take one of two broad forms: fraud or reconveyance transactions.'
A. The Growing "Market" of Victims
That home prices have risen sharply in recent years is well known. The Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight reports that housing prices rose over 55 percent in the five-year period ending September 3o, 2oo5.2 In several regions the
increase during this period has been extraordinary-more than ioo percent in
1My description of foreclosure equity-stripping schemes in this article is based on my review of documents and interviews
from over thirty foreclosure equity-stripping transactions in Minnesota, review of dozens of complaints and decisions from
other jurisdictions, and the National Consumer Law Center report, infra n. 8
2

Off ice of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. House Price Index for the Third Quarter of 2005, at 24(Dec 1, 2005),
available at www ofheo.gov/media/pdf/3qO5hpi pdf
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California, Hawaii, and3 the District of result of predatory practices. As one
Columbia, for example.
commentator noted:
Less understood is that foreclosure rates
appear to have risen while housing prices
were escalating and stayed at high levels
despite the supposed economic recovery.
In 1986, o.26 percent of homes entered
foreclosure. The rate rose steadily, exceeding 0.40 percent for the first time in 1998.
It peaked at 0.46 percent in 2ooi-2oo2 and
has since remained above 0.40 percent. 4
Either trend alone would likely result in
more homeowners who are in foreclosure and have substantial equity. Other
things being equal, rising home prices
would mean that any given homeowner in
foreclosure would have a greater chance
of having substantial equity, and higher
foreclosure rates would mean more people in foreclosure at every level of equity.
Together these trends result in a larger
number of distressed foreclosed homeowners with substantial equity and thus a
ripe and expanding market for the
unscrupulous.
Subprime lending, which has exploded
over the last decade, may be an important
component connecting these trends.
From 1994 through 2oo3, subprime
originations increased by over 9oo percent and amounted to more than io percent of all mortgage refinancing originations by 2004. 5The foreclosure rate for
subprime loans has been estimated at
more than ten times the rate for conforming loans. 6 The problem is not just
the increase in subprime loans but the
accompanying increase in the rate of
subprime foreclosures, apparently as a

One might expect the number of
subprime foreclosures to increase
as the overall number of subprime loan originations increase.
Significantly, however, the growth
of subprime foreclosures has
substantially outstripped the
growth of subprime originations
and the speed at which subprime
loans have gone into foreclosures
has also increased dramatically.
These data suggest, at best, great
inefficiency in the subprime
mortgage underwriting process;
but, more troubling, they also
suggest that predatory terms and
practices produce these rates of
foreclosure. In Chicago, for
example, the proportion of subprime mortgage originations
increased from 3% to 24%
between 1991 and 1997; during
roughly the same period, however, the subprime share of foreclosures increased from 1.3% to
35.7%.7
B. Types of Foreclosure
Equity-Stripping Schemes
Foreclosure equity- stripping schemes
vary tremendously. A recent National
Consumer Law Center survey of cases and
work in this area by state attorneys general, legal aid attorneys, and other consumer attorneys cataloged wide variation
in how the acquirer obtains control of a
home and its equity. 8 The report found a
broad range of local actors perpetrating

3

1d. at 15. Florida, Nevada, and Rhode Island have seen at least a 99 percent gain and twelve other states, including all
of New England, have seen gains of at least 60 percent. In the last year alone, house prices in Arizona rose over 30 percent, while eleven other states-including Idaho, Delaware, and Oregon-saw at least a 15 percent increase. Id.
4

OFFICE OF POLICYDEVELOPMENT
AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSINGAND URBANDEVELOPMENT,
U S HOUSINGMARKET

CONDITIONS-3RD QUARTER
2005 at 74 (2005).
5

ROBERTO
G. QUERCIAETAL., CENTERFORCOMMUNITY CAPITALISM,
THEIMPACTOFPREDATORY
LOANTERMSON SUBPRIME
FORECLOSURES:

THESPECIAL
CASEOFPREPAYMENT
PENALTIES
AND BALLOONPAYMENTS
2 (2005), available

at www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/doc-

uments/foreclosurepaper.pdf.
6

1d.

7

Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratones of Experimentation, 57 FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
295, 344 (2005).
8

STEVE
TRIPOLI
& ELIZABETH
RENUART,
NATIONAL
CONSUMER
LAWCENTER,DREAMSFORECLOSED:
THERAMPANT
THEFTOFAMERICANS'
HOMES

THROUGH
FORECLOSURE
"RESCUE"
SCAMS
(2005) [hereinafter NCLC Report), available at www.consumerlaw.org/news/contentForeclosureReportFinal.pdf.
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these schemes, with no national companies engaged in systemic operations.

ing "loan administrator," that Home
Funding sent an appraiser to the home as
part of the refinancing, and that Home
Funding fraudulently obtained a warranty deed from the Ruddys by telling them it
was paperwork to get the loan started.
Without the Ruddys' knowledge, Home
Funding transferred the property to an
associate, Mr. Johnson, for $126,ooo.
Home Funding told the Ruddys it completed the refinancing without them. The
Ruddys made a few payments to Home
Funding on what they thought was their
new loan before receiving a "rent"
demand from Johnson, whom they did
not know. Mr. Ruddy's employer helped
him research county property records,
leading to discovery of title transfers to
Home Funding and then to Johnson.

Acquirers can easily identify homeowners to solicit because the information
needed is public record. Foreclosure filings require some form of public notice.
States that require judicial foreclosure
create a courthouse file of potential targets, while nonjudicial foreclosure procedures typically require some form of
public notice, usually by advertisement.
The other necessary element of the
scheme is equity. Judicial filings or public notices of foreclosure are likely to
include the amount of the underlying
mortgage in default and the amount
required to prevent loss of the property.
Nonforeclosing mortgagees and other
liens against the property also are matIn Rowland v. Haven Properties an elderly
ters of public record.
widow owned a home in Chicago." After
1. Fraud
being inundated with foreclosure rescue
Some rescue scams are simple fraud or offers to help her -save her home," she
plainly deceptive trade practices, often
responded to an offer stating that she had
against vulnerable homeowners. A com- been "heavily screened and pre-qualimon transaction of this sort involves the fied!" and that the acquirer was "able to
acquirer obtaining a warranty deed to the 'quickly refinanc[e] homes out of foreproperty under the pretense of starting a closure!"' Ms. Rowland attended what
refinancing or other deceptive represen- she thought was a refinance closing and
tation. The acquirer then files the deed, unknowingly "sold" her house, valued at
transferring ownership of the property to $245,000, for a $91,500 loan. Only later
himself or an associate, and moves to did she learn that she had allegedly
evict the foreclosed homeowner. A great become a renter in her home at a monthvariety of other types of simple fraud in ly payment she could not afford.
this area is seen as well. The following are
In Jumper v. Hayes the plaintiff, a 68three examples: 9
year- old man on dialysis, alleged fraud in
In State v. Home Funding CorporationJason an action to clear title to his home in
and Tanya Ruddy, a St. Paul, Minnesota, Washington, D.C., and obtain damages
couple, owned a home worth about against multiple people." Mr. Jumper
$145,000 with a loan of about $8o,ooo in and his wife, now deceased, had about
foreclosure.' 0 The Minnesota attorney $s8o,ooo in equity on a home worth
general alleged that Home Funding told about $33o,ooo. They were in foreclothe Ruddys that it would refinance the sure when a realtor whom they trusted
loan, that a Home Funding representa- advised them that they could not obtain
tive gave the Ruddys a business card stat- refinancing and should sell their home to

9

See generally Josiah Kibe, Comment: Closing the Door on Unfair Foreclosure Practices in Colorado, 74 UNIVERSITY OF
CoLORAoo LAW REVIEW
241 (2003) (offering a hypothetical example of a simple fraud equity-stripping transaction and
describing equity-stripping problem in Colorado)
10

state v Home Funding Corporation, No C4-03-7691 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dakota County filed April 28,2003) On
December 23, 2005, the state received a judgment for $1,992,652 in restitution and $2,582,763 in civil penalties I was
involved in the prosecution of this case as lead attorney for part of the litigation and as supervising attorney for the case.
1

1Rowland v Haven Properties, No. 05cl 957, 2005 WL 1528264 (N D III. June 24, 2005) (rejecting motion to dismiss)

12

jumper v Hayes, No. 04-ca-6241 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Aug 2004)
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obtain the equity. Defendant Hayes then
solicited them and promised what the
Jumpers were led to believe was a $15,000
loan to bring their mortgage loan current.
Ms. Hayes had them sign a deed transferring sole ownership to her. Unknown to the
Jumpers, she used the deed to obtain first
one loan and then, four months later,
another. After another three months, Hayes
attempted to sell the house and evict Mr.
Jumper, who learned for the first time that
Hayes considered him a renter in his home.
2. Reconveyance Transactions
Reconveyance transactions are probably
more prevalent and definitely harder to
deconstruct for purposes of a lawsuit that
will give the victim relief. The essence of
these schemes is that the acquirer
obtains title to the home in foreclosure
and then "reconveys" possession and an
interest in the property back to the
homeowner, with the supposed goal of
transferring title back to the homeowner.
The acquirer ultimately either completes
the reconveyance of the title back to the
foreclosed homeowner or, probably
much more commonly, evicts the foreclosed homeowner and sells the property.

a written solicitation sent to homeowners. 13 Acquirers also make these claims in
newspaper advertisements, telemarketing,
and in-person solicitations of foreclosed
homeowners. A typical advertisement
reads:
"IsYour Home In Foreclosure?
We Can Help." "We Can Save Your
Property And Even Give You
Cash In Hand." "We Can Pay
Your Mortgage For One Year And
AllowYou Time to Recover." "Our
Program Requires No Down
Payment Or Up-front Cash." "We
Are The Experts And We Have
Helped Hundreds fPeple."14

A second primary marketing representation is the bogus offer of refinancing. As
described above, this representation often
is used in simple fraudulent schemes to
obtain title without the homeowners
knowing that they have sold the home. In
other cases, a false promise of refinancing
serves to lure the homeowner into a relationship with the acquirer, who then
switches the terms of the deal to a foreclosure reconveyance. One such tactic
involves "running the clock." The acquirer
Some simple fraud schemes may be leads the homeowner to believe refinancreconveyance transactions on paper, but ing is in progress and then, near the end of
the homeowner is unaware that any title the redemption period, tells the hometransfer has occurred. In this subsection owner that the deal fell through. The
I analyze the more common problem acquirer then offers the reconveyance
where foreclosed homeowners under- scheme as the only option available.
stand that they have entered into a deal to
transfer and then reacquire title. These Acquirers have accompanied these promtransactions vary widely in form, but the ises with other representations. Acquirers
solicitation, acquisition- reconveyance, promote the notion that they have special
and dispossession-eviction phases of the expertise to deal with the complex problems and anxiety created by foreclosure
scheme often have common elements.
and often imply that the acquirer can offer
a. Solicitation
the homeowner a variety of options for
Acquirers introduce themselves to fore- resolving the foreclosure. One standard
closed homeowners both through direct letter by an acquirer stated:
marketing and through mortgage brokers.
We look out for your interests.
(1) Acquirer Direct Marketing
We share vital facts about foreclosure.
If these schemes have one common characWe can stop the foreclosure process.
teristic, it is the promise by the acquirer to
"help stop the foreclosure" and "save" the
We can help you restore your credit.
home. Often this representation is made in
We can help'you save your homestead.
3

1 See NCLC Report, supra note 8, at 57.
14Johnson v Home Savers, No. 04-5427 (ED.NY filed Dec. 14, 2004).
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There are so many options for
you to choose from. Schedule
your no hassle just plain facts
consultation today. Let us try and
help you figure out solutions so
you can sleep at night. 15
In reality this list of options was alleged
to have narrowed to one-a reconveyance
transaction that gave the acquirer title to
the property through a sham junior
mortgage.16
Acquirers also rely on creating a sense of
urgency. Some foreclosed homeowners
face loss of the home in weeks or days as

the foreclosure redemption period
comes to an end, and thus the urgency is
real. In most cases, however, homeowners have sufficient time to sell the home,
complete a loan restructuring, or evaluate other options.
Acquirers also have used affinity marketing techniques-appeals to racial, religious, or ethnic solidarity-to build a
false sense of trust. The National
Consumer Law Center report offers an
example of a solicitation from an African
American acquirer promising all the
usual offers ("You can stop all the foreclosure stress today. We will lend you the
money for the foreclosure ... ") and
handwritten representations that included: "We tell you what they won't & help
you. They can't stand to see young brothers doing what they do." 17
(Z) Mortgage Brokers
Acquirers also market themselves to
mortgage brokers who deal with homeowners with subprime loans and offer a
fee for referring foreclosed homeowners.
For homeowners who are unlikely to
qualify for refinancing, the referral for
the reconveyance transaction gives the
mortgage broker an otherwise unobtainable fee. Acquirers also can obtain business from mortgage brokers by paying
referral commissions in excess of the
fees the mortgage broker could earn

through a refinance. Acquirers and brokers have participated jointly in the
above-described running the clock
scheme, with the broker introducing the
acquirer as a rescuer to the desperate
homeowner facing the end of the
redemption period.
b. Acquisition and Reconveyance
I use the term "acquirer" to mean a person who solicits the foreclosed homeowner, acquires title to the property, and
then reconveys some interest to the
homeowner. In fact, many foreclosure
reconveyance transactions are not so
simple; they involve intervening transfers of title and other interests. And a
plethora of methods can be used to
accomplish the different interest transfers, depending on the limits and obligations of state foreclosure procedures and
individual differences in the approach of
the actors. In this subsection I briefly
address: () the conveyance of title from
the foreclosed homeowner to the acquirer; (2) the form of the reconveyance; and
(3) other transfers of interest and actors
involved in the acquisition-reconveyance process.
(1) Transfer of interest to acquirer.
Transfer of title from the foreclosed
homeowner has been accomplished by
several methods, including () deed
transfer at the same time as a closing on
the reconveyance, (2) deed transfer prior
to the reconveyance, (3) creation of a
mortgage interest, and (4) creation of
another lien or judgment interest.
The easiest reconveyance transaction to
track by document trail is a closing at
which the foreclosed homeowner transfers title to the acquirer and the acquirer
reconveys an interest back to the foreclosed homeowner. More often, however,
transfer of title to the acquirer appears to
occur before the execution of any interest
back to the homeowner. In many cases,
the acquirer simply presents the fore-

15State v HJE, No. 03-cv-05554 (D Minn filed Oct. 16, 2003)
6

1 1d.
7

1 See NCLC Report, supra note 8, at 54-62 (examples of written solicitations).
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closed homeowner with a deed in favor of
the acquirer. The foreclosed homeowner
executes the deed; the acquirer records it
and later reconveys an interest back to the
homeowner. Even when a closing occurs, it
appears more common that the closing is
limited to the conveyance to the acquirer,
with the reconveyance transaction later
".closing" in a separate, often informal,
document signing. This "secret" second
closing often is done to avoid drawing the
attention of the mortgage lender making
the loan to the acquirer. The transaction
may violate mortgage terms such as a "due
on sale" clause.

default by the foreclosed homeownerThe contract for deed typically can be
cancelled within a short period. The purchase option of the lease is almost always
predicated on performance of the lease,
thus allowing cancellation of the purchase option if the foreclosed homeowner fails to make a timely rent payment.
Both these options typically are structured for a fairly short period before a
balloon payment is due on the contract
for deed or the purchase option in the
lease expires.
In the typical reconveyance transaction,
the acquirer sets a repurchase price that
substantially exceeds the costs of acquiring the property but is below fair market
value. The foreclosed homeowner usually
pays rent or contract for deed payments
that exceed the acquirer's monthly carrying costs and almost always exceed the
monthly payments that were due under
the mortgage in foreclosure. Therefore
the acquirer can profit from monthly
payments and the excess repurchase
price should the homeowner actually
complete the terms of the reconveyance
and once again obtain title to the property. In Palmer v. Roberts, for example, the

Acquirers also have gained title by using
mortgage or judgment interests acquired
during the foreclosure procedure. Some
acquirers give (or promise) $50 or
another small amount to the homeowner
for a junior mortgage on the home, thus
enabling the acquirer to obtain title at the
end of the foreclosure redemption period. Of course, this is a risky strategy if not
carefully executed, as another junior
creditor may gain title by paying all senior lien holders. Acquirers also have
"created" judgments that allow them to
redeem and purchase existing junior
mortgages, mechanic liens, or judgments acquirer gave $95,000 in consideration
as a means of obtaining title.
to obtain title to the home and then
reconveyed it to the homeowner for
The acquirer sometimes presents the
$141,000, with monthly payments of over
entire transaction in the form of a written
$s,!oo-more than the homeowner's
contract with the foreclosed homeowner
prior mortgage amount. 19
outlining the responsibilities of each
party. These contracts usually specify the Acquirers have on occasion structured
fees that the acquirer will obtain at dif- other forms of the reconveyance, includferent points in the transaction.
ing life estates for elderly foreclosed
homeowners.
(2)Reconveyance Interest
The form and terms of the reconveyance (3) Other Actors and Acquirer Mortgages
vary as well. The two common options
that acquirers use are reconveyance by a
contract for deed and lease with a purchase option.18 In most states these two
mechanisms have the advantage to the
acquirer of allowing for rapid dispossession of any interest in the home on

There also may be a transfer of title or
mortgage interest prior to the grant of a
reconveyance interest to the homeowner.
In this scheme, acquirers find investors
to whom they transfer title, either before
or after the reconveyance. In other situations the acquirer acts more like a bro-

181use the term "contract for deed," which is synonymous with the following: installment land contract, long-term land
contract, installment sale contract, bond for deed, and land sale contract. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY,MORTGAGES
§ 3.4 (1997).
19Palmer v Roberts, No. 04cv73635, 2005 WL 1631267, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 6, 2005) (opinion and order denying
defendant's motion for dismissal and summary judgment).
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ker, bringing the foreclosed homeowner new "owner." When all the transactions
and the investor together to complete the (transfer of title to the acquirer, mortgage
2
entire acquisition and reconveyance. 0 financing in the name of the acquirer,
Foreclosed homeowners often complain and reconveyance of interest to the forethat the investor is not made known to closed homeowner) occur simultaneousthem until the end of the process. In ly at the closing, acquirers use a variety of
some cases, the foreclosed homeowner means to obtain some or all of the prolearns who actually took title only on ceeds, including (1) establishing a "sale
being served an eviction notice.
price" to the acquirer in the amount of
existing liens against the property rather
A critical issue in dissecting many forethan fair market value, (2) creating a sellclosure reconveyance deals is the grant of
er carryback note and mortgage (or at
a mortgage by the acquirer (or investor).
least listing such on the HUD-1 (U.S.
The financing that the acquirer or
Department of Housing and Urban
investor uses will determine when and
Development) financing statement), (3)
whether the acquirer obtains a mortgage
assessing "fees" to obtain the proceeds,
and the form the mortgage takes. Some
and (4) having the foreclosed homeownacquirers have sufficient assets, or
er endorse the proceeds check to the
financing in the form of a general line of
acquirer following the closing. There
credit, to complete the transaction withremains the "back-end" payment when
out putting a lien on the home. Others
the acquirer obtains the remaining equihave a banking relationship with a finanty in the property through eviction and
21
cial institution that understands that it is
resale.

investing in a foreclosure reconveyance
deal and gives the acquirer a short-term
mortgage. Some acquirers have no regular source of financing and typically
obtain mortgage refinancing at the time
of or prior to completing the reconveyance. Others must rely on an
investor's creditworthiness to obtain the
mortgage financing necessary to complete the transaction.
Tracking the proceeds of the mortgage
financing also is important to understand
the transaction. Acquirers have obtained
"front-end" payments that create positive
cash flow for the acquirer at the beginning
of the deal. For instance, when lenders provide financing for 8o percent of the loan
value, but the foreclosed mortgage and
other liens and closing costs are less than
this amount, there are proceeds to be distributed at the closing. When the acquirer
takes a deed to the property, uses the deed
to complete the refinancing, and then later
grants a reconveyance interest to the foreclosed homeowner, the mortgage transaction is structured as a refinancing and the
acquirer takes the closing proceeds as the

Acquirers often use the same closing
agent, title company, and mortgage broker in repeated transactions. Given the
often specious nature of some aspects of
the closing, this practice gives the acquirer allies in convincing the foreclosed
homeowner that the transaction is being
handled properly.
c. Dispossession-Eviction
Foreclosure reconveyance deals are
almost always straightforward equity
lending. The acquirer seldom engages in
any form of underwriting to determine if
the foreclosed homeowner has the capacity to meet the obligations required to
complete the reconveyance. Not surprisingly, as a result, the homeowner is often
unable to meet the terms for reconveyance and the acquirer takes possession of the home. In some cases, acquirers design the plan to fail so that they can
take control of the property and liquidate
remaining equity.
A lease can usually be terminated more
quickly than a mortgage or even a contract for deed. A default on the lease also

20

lnvestors' participation and culpability vary widely, from full participation in the sale and structuring of the deal to victimization by an acquirer who saddles them with a mortgage in excess of the property's value-and everything in
between.
2

1The grant of a mortgage by the acquirer raises, for the foreclosed homeowner's attorney, legal issues that are beyond
the scope of this article,
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allows the acquirer to terminate the purchase option. A few acquirers have
attempted to make transactions look
more likely to succeed by initially placing
the rent or contract for deed payments in
escrow, although this does little to help a
foreclosed homeowner who must find
sufficient funds to complete the purchase
option or make the contract for deed balloon payment in order to regain title.
In the remainder of this article I identify
and analyze legal theories that advocates can
use to protect homeowners subject to foreclosure equity- stripping schemes and, in
particular, reconveyance transactions. I set
forth three legal claims commonly used in
foreclosure equity- stripping cases (II). I
briefly catalog other statutory and common-law theories to consider when advocating for foreclosed homeowners subject
to equity stripping (III). For the sake of
reducing a hopelessly complex subject to a
manageable topic, the legal theories I present below are for the most part predicated
on the assumption that the transaction
involves a single "acquirer" who is the primary solicitor of the foreclosed homeowner
and who takes title and completes the
scheme by a reconveyance of an interest in
2
the home to the foreclosed homeowner.3
II. Primary Legal Theories to
Challenge Foreclosure
Equity-Stripping Transactions

3
ties or foreclosure consultants.2 A prac-

titioner confronted with a problem in one
of these states should determine if the law
applies in the client's situation. In any
event, three legal theories are commonly
used in foreclosure equity- stripping
cases: (s) equitable mortgage, (2) the
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act,
and (3) state laws on unfair and deceptive
acts and practices.
A. Equitable Mortgage
The doctrine of equitable mortgage
allows courts to look past the formal salereconveyance documents and, in certain
circumstances, to characterize the entire
transaction as a mortgage refinancing. A
successful equitable mortgage argument
can offer several benefits to foreclosed
homeowners who enter into reconveyance transactions.
1. Establishing an
Equitable Mortgage
'"Acourt of equity will look to the substance
of the transaction over the form to ascertain
the intentions of the parties" in determining whether to find an equitable mortgage. 2 4 The parties' intent is the touchstone, but "specific mortgage -negating
language in conditional sale transactions"
is not dispositive of intent. 2 5 Rather, in
ascertaining whether a transaction should
be treated as an equitable mortgage, courts
have looked to a variety of other factors as
evidence of the parties' intent.

Despite growing legislative interest, as
of the end of 2oo5 only five states The Restatement of Property (Third) sets
(California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, forth seven factors for consideration in
and Mirmesota) had legislation regulating determining whether a reconveyance
certain purchasers of foreclosure proper22

Even if the facts confronting the practitioner differ from this model, the legal theories likely apply in some form, albeit
with different claims against different actors. In this article I do not address at least three types of other legal problems
that often confront practitioners in foreclosure reconveyance cases. First, some foreclosed homeowners do not seek help
until they face eviction or imminent likelihood of such proceedings. This situation can raise the problem of how to assert,
in a court whose jurisdiction is limited to determining the propriety of the eviction demand, the foreclosed homeowner's
claim that the transaction should be rescinded. Second, and perhaps most important, a number of issues arise when the
acquirer or investor grants a mortgage interest as part of the financing of the transaction-an interest that often precedes
the reconveyance interest of the foreclosed homeowner. The foreclosed homeowner then confronts the problem of invalidating or coping with this mortgage interest. There also are concerns with fraud or breach of contract with the mortgagee when the acquirer reconveys an interest to the foreclosed homeowner without the mortgagee's knowledge, Third,
a recent trend is for acquirers to establish trusts to which the foreclosed homeowner transfers title and from which the
homeowner receives the reconveyance.
23

See infra II.A. 1

24

Thomas C Homburger & Brian P Gallagher, To Pay or Not to Pay: Claiming Damages For Recharacterization of Sale
Leaseback Transactions Under Owner's Title Insurance Policies, 30 REALPROPERTY,
PROBATE
At. TRUST
JOURNAL
443 (1995)
25

614

RESTATENIEtT
(THIRD)
OFPROPERTY
MORTGAGES
§ 3,3 cmt d (1997).
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26
transaction is an equitable mortgage.
The Restatement's comments and illustration make clear that foreclosure
reconveyance is exactly the type of transaction that falls within this doctrine and
specifically describe both sale-contractfor-deed deals and sale -leaseback-withoption arrangements as possible equitable mortgages.2?7 One commentator
recently identified fifteen factors that
courts have used in construing equitable
mortgage claims and noted that courts
were not consistent on which factors
were deemed relevant or how to weigh
them.28

and (5) a prior relationship between the
homeowner and the acquirer or associated people regarding promises or
attempts at a more traditional refinance.

Several courts have found an equitable
mortgage in foreclosure reconveyance
transactions, including sale-leaseback
deals, or rejected judgment for the
defendant as a matter of law for these
transactions.? 9 In the Rowland case
described above, the court rejected
defendant's motion to dismiss the equitable mortgage argument despite sale
documents clearly stating that the homeowner was selling and then leasing back
Foreclosure reconveyance transactions the home. In reaching this conclusion
frequently contain the following facts the court particularly noted the3unequal
o
that can help establish an equitable bargaining power of the parties.
mortgage: (1) the acquirer's statements Although especially well-suited to many
that the purpose of the deal is to help the foreclosure reconveyance transactions.
homeowner save or stay in the home; (2) proving an equitable mortgage can be an
a substantial difference between the uphill battle for the seller-grantee (the
price of the conveyance to the acquirer foreclosed homeowner in the context of
and the property's fair market value, and this article). 3' Some courts require the
a difference between the repurchase seller-grantee to prove the existence of
price and market value; (3) retention by the equitable mortgage by clear and conthe foreclosed homeowner not only of vincing evidence. 2 By contrast, under
possession but also of the obligations and both the Restatement and several state
prerogatives of ownership, such as paying statutes, the seller may use parol evitaxes and insurance and being responsi- dence to prove the true intent of the
ble for repairs; (4) the complexity of the transaction in the face of contrary written
transaction coupled with a substantial documents. 3 3
disparity in sophistication of the parties;

26

1d. § 3.3(b). The seven factors are (1) statements of the parties; (2) substantial disparity between the value received by
the grantor and the fair market value of the real estate at the time of conveyance; (3) terms on which the grantor may
purchase the real estate; (4) grantor's retention of possession; (5) grantor's continued payment of real estate taxes, (6)
grantor's postconveyance improvements to the real estate; and (7) nature of the parties and their relationship before and
after the conveyance. Section 3.2 of the Restatement is similar but deals with transfers of deed without the conditional
resale that is characteristic of a foreclosure reconveyance transaction.
27
28

1d., illus. 3-7.
john C. Murray, Recharactenzation Issues in Sale-Leaseback Transactions, PROBATE
ANOPROPERTY,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 18-

19.
29

See Brown v Grant Holding, 394 F Supp. 2d 1090 (D. Minn. 2005); James v Ragin, 432 F.Supp. 887 (WD N C 1977);

Hrubyv Larsen, No 05-894, 2005 WL 1540130 (D Minn. June 30, 2005) (unpublished) (granting preliminary injunction
to homeowner); Rowland v Haven Properties Limited Liability Company, No. 05c1957, 2005 WL 1528264 (ND III. June
24, 2005) (memorandum opinion and order unpublished) (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss); Gagne v Hoban, 159
N.W.2d 896, 899-900 (Minn. 1968) (upholding lower court finding of equitable mortgage in a farm foreclosure reconveyance); Smith v Potter, 406 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1981).
30

Rowland, 2005 WL 1528264, at *3-5.

3 1
3 2

33

Murray, supra note 28, at 19.
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF PROPERTY-MORTGAGES §

3.3(b) (1997).

1d. § 3,3(a); see also Kibe, supra note 9, at 262 (collecting statutory cites)
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2. Using the Equitable Mortgage
Doctrine to Help the Foreclosed
Homeowner Recover Title
Establishing an equitable mortgage
offers the foreclosed homeowner several
benefits. The obvious and direct result
will be that the homeowner is held to
retain title and gains the right to another
foreclosure procedure. As an indirect
result, the homeowner may find it much
easier to assert a variety of other claims,
including usury and protection under
various federal and state consumer credit statutes and state mortgage licensing
laws. 3 4

loan is likely to be consumer credit for
Hoepa purposes if the underlying transaction is found to be an equitable mortgage or if the transaction is a reconveyance in which the returned interest
instrument is a contract for deed.

The "credit" definition presents more of
a concern when the repurchase part of a
reconveyance scheme is a lease with
option to purchase. Staff Commentary to
Regulation Z, however, makes clear that a
lease can be a credit sale if the consumer
"assumes the indicia of ownership." 3 8 In
many lease options with these schemes,
the consumer does exactly that-someB. Home Ownership Equity
times agreeing to perform all mainteProtection Act
nance, pay real estate taxes and homeowner's insurance, or assume similar
The federal high-cost loan law, the Home
ownership obligations.
Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(Hoepa), provides a useful tool in many b. "Secured by the Consumer's
foreclosure equity-stripping cases. 3 5 In
Principal Dwelling"
most such cases, whether your client has If the foreclosed homeowner can establish
a Hoepa claim will depend on whether an equitable mortgage, the arrangement
the loan qualifies as a Hoepa loan-if it obviously will qualify as a transaction
does, proving liability typically will be "secured by the consumer's principal
easy. Hoepa then offers powerful statuto- dwelling." If an equitable mortgage is not
ry remedies for the homeowner.
established, or as an alternative argument
on motion, the transaction still might be
1. Qualifying as a Hoepa Loan
A Hoepa loan is "a consumer credit considered as securing a consumer's principal dwelling. The language of Section
transaction that is secured by the con16ow(aa) of Hoepa does not require that the
sumer's principal dwelling" that meets
cost and annual-percentage -rate trig- credit extended be a mortgage. In particular, reconveyance deals in which the repurgers. 3 6 Below I discuss several elements
chase is through a contract for deed likely
of this definition in greater detail; I also
qualify. The Staff Commentary to Section
address the requirement that the lender
!26.2(a)(24) of Regulation Z, which relates
be defined as a "creditor" under Hoepa.
to "residential mortgage loans," specifia. "Consumer Credit"
cally mentions contracts for deed as a
3
"Consumer credit" under Hoepa means type of loan secured by a dwelling. 9
"the right to defer payment of debt or to
Note that the definition of a 16 o2i(aa)
incur debt and defer its payment." 3 7 A
loan also specifically excludes "residen34

See infra III.A.4 (usury), II.B (federal consumer credit statutes including the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act
(Hoepa) and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)), III.A.2 (state mortgage licensing laws), and Ill A 3 (other state consumer credit statutes).
3515 US.C. § 1639 (1994) The terms of TILA, Hoepa's statutory parent, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 (1976) et seq., are woven
into many Hoepa requirements. Both laws are implemented in Regulation Z, 12 C.FR § 226 (2001), with Hoepa regulations in Sections 31-32 and 34. For readers seeking a more nearly complete analysis of the basics of Hoepa and TILA, see
ELIZABETHRENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (5th ed 2003)
3615 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (1994).
3712 C.F R § 226.2(a)(12) (2001), which incorporates the term "credit" defined under 15 U.S.C § 1602(e) and 12 C.F.R
§ 226.2(a)(14) (2001).
38Regulation Z, 12 C.FR. § 226.17 (2001) Official Staff Commentary § 226 17(a)(1)-7.
3 9

Official Staff Commentary § 226.2(a)(24) n.5.
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tial mortgage transactions," defined as "a
transaction in which a mortgage, deed of
trust, purchase money security interest
arising under an installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security
interest is created or retained against the
consumer's dwelling to finance the
acquisition or initial construction of such
dwelling." 4' The acquirer may argue that
the reconveyance of the property included money for "acquisition" of the home,
but the Staff Commentary specifically
rejects this notion, stating that "a transaction is not 'to finance the acquisition'
...if the consumer had previously purchased the dwelling and acquired some
title." 4 1
c. Triggers
The foreclosed homeowner also must
establish that the loan meets one of the
Hoepa triggers of 8 percent of the loan
amount in "points and fees" or an annual
percentage rate exceeding a comparable
Treasury yield by 8 percent for a first lien
loan. 4 2 In a reconveyance transaction,
this problem usually can be analyzed in
three steps.

chase portion alone does not clearly
meet one of the two triggers, calculate
points and fees by considering the sale
and repurchase as one unified transaction. Add all the costs from the sale and
repurchase to see if point and fees total
8 percent of the loan amount. Again, if
the transaction is an equitable mortgage, all costs can be aggregated
because the sale portion of the transaction is construed as providing a security interest for the repurchase "loan."
Otherwise, the argument shifts to
whether the sale costs are "points and
fees" within the meaning of Section
226.32(b). This section defines "points
and fees" to include a noninterest
"finance charge" as defined under
Section 226.4; the "finance charge"
includes "any charge payable directly
or indirectly by the consumer and
imposed directly or indirectly by the
creditor as an incident to or a condition
of the extension of credit." 4 4 The costs
incurred by the foreclosed homeowner
in the sale agreement certainly would
appear to be incident to, or a condition
of, the overall transaction. 4 5

(1)Do the repurchasechargesmeet eithertrig(3) Treat lost equity as a finance charge. If
ger? Consider whether the repurchase
the points-and-fees trigger is not
portion of the transaction, standing
established when the sale and repuralone, meets either trigger. As to the
chase are considered components of
annual -percentage-rate trigger, note
one transaction, determine whether
that the base rate for determining the
lost equity can be construed as a
trigger is the market rate for a Treasury
finance charge. Usually the acquirer
security with a -comparable period of
structures the deal to capture a profit
maturity."4 3 If the repurchase is
by creating a difference between the
through a contract for deed with a balhomeowner's "sale" price for the
loon payment, or through an option to
property and a much higher repurrepurchase with a time limit, then the
chase price, in case the foreclosed
comparable Treasury note rate should
homeowner completes the repurbe for this shorter period (and thus
chase. This difference arguably is a
presumably lower).
finance charge. The definition of
finance charge in Section ?26.4
(:) Does the unified transaction meet the
includes charges payable "indirectly"
points-and-fees trigger? If the repur4015 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (1994) and 12 CFR. §226.2(a)(24) (2001)
4 1

Official Staff Commentary § 226.2(a)(24) n.5.

4212 CF.R § 226,32(a)(1)(i) (2001). The annual percentage rate must be in excess of 10 percent if the loan is a subordinate lien. Id.
431d.
44/d. § 226.4(a)
45

See NCLC Report, supra note 8, §§ 2.5,2, 2.5.3, 3.6 4 The definition of "points and fees" is broader than the rule for

which loan charges constitutes a finance charge Cf. 12 C.FR §§ 2264, 226 32(b)(1) (2001)
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In some cases it may be easy to determine
that the transaction was accomplished
through a traditional mortgage broker,
thus making it unnecessary to discover
any other loan transactions conducted by
the acquirer. Other cases may have
involved an intermediary between the
acquirer and the foreclosed homeowner,
but that this person acted as a mortgage
broker is less clear. Hoepa and
Regulation Z do not define "mortgage
broker." A federal district court recently
issued a preliminary injunction and
found that a person who acts to assist a
traditional refinance in the beginning of
a transaction is a broker for Hoepa purd. "Creditor"
poses even if the eventual transaction
Hoepa imposes requirements only on a takes the different form of a recon"creditor"-one
veyance deal. 4 9
by the homeowner or imposed "indirectly" by the creditor. Because the
lower sale price was a necessary predicate to the repurchase part of the transaction, this lost equity can be held as an
indirect charge that the foreclosed
homeowner pays to repurchase the
home. Whether this amount is characterized as points and fees or as "finance
charge" probably will not matter once
it is determined to be a finance charge.
In the latter case, this finance charge
amount added to existing interest payments likely will cause an annual percentage rate in excess of the trigger.

(A) who regularly extends consumer
credit that is subject to a finance
charge or is payable by written agree ment in more than 4 installments
(not including a down payment), and
(B) to whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the
note or contract, or by agreement
6
when there is no note or contract.4

(W "Regularly Extends Credit"
Compared to the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), Hoepa substantially relaxes the
standards for who qualifies as a person
regularly extending credit.47 Under
Hoepa, one is a creditor if "in any 12month period, the person originates
more than one credit extension that is
subject to the requirements of§ z6.3g or
one or more such credit extensions
8
through a mortgage broker."4

If the transaction was not "through a
mortgage broker," the foreclosed homeowner must meet the alternative definition: that the acquirer conducted at least
one other Hoepa transaction not through
a mortgage broker "in any 1z-month
period" or otherwise meets the general
definition of regularly extending credit
under TILA.5 ° Many acquirers do not
engage in a large number of transactions,
or at least their other transactions may be
difficult to find and classify as an extension of Hoepa credit. Conducting discovery or searching public records to locate
other deals in which the acquirer took an
interest in real estate, and investigating
those transactions, may be necessary.
(2) "To Whom the Obligation Is
Initially Payable"

4615 U S.C. §§ 1635 (1995), 1639 (1994), 1640-41 (1995), 12 C.FR 226.2(a)(17). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f ) (1994).
The language referring separately to high-cost loans in the definition of "creditor" in 15 U.S. C. 1602(f) (1994) arguably
changes and loosens the two-part requirement in the former part of this subsection. This argument was expressly rejected in Viernes v. Executive Mortgage Inc., 372 F Supp. 2d 576 (D. Haw. 2004).
47

The general TILA requirements are stated in note 3 to 12 C.FR. § 226,2(a)(17): the person must have extended credit
either more than twenty-five times in the preceding (or current) calendar year or more than five times for transactions
secured by a dwelling in the preceding (or current) calendar year.
4812 C FR. § 226.2(a)(17) n.3 (2001).
49

Hruby v. Larsen, 2005 WL 1540130 (D. Minn. 2005). The court relied on a dictionary definition of a mortgage broker
as "[a]n individual or organization that markets mortgage loans and brings lenders and borrowers together" in reaching
206 (8th ed. 2004). Many states, including Minnesota, define mortgage broker in a
its result BLAck's LAw DICTIONARY
licensing statute, although nothing requires a court to use this definition for Hoepa purposes.
50

See supra note 47 The language "in any 12-month period" is broader than the temporal reference for determining
creditor status for non-Hoepa TILA loans. Whether one could successfully argue the literal translation of this provision Is
unclear -e.g., that two such Hoepa loans in a twelve-month period three years ago are sufficient to bring the iender
within the TILA definition of creditor, or if the two loans must be within the current twelve-month period
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Advocates must identify correctly the party
who is potentially liable as a creditor
under Hoepa. The definition of "creditor"
is restricted to the person "to whom the
obligation is initially payable." In particular, under Hoepa, the repurchase seller,
not the acquirer, is the proper party in a
reconveyance transaction where these two
actors are different, that is, where the
acquirer obtains title and then flips the
property to an "investor" or other person
who takes title and acts as the reseller of
the house to the foreclosed homeowner. 5 1
Once the appropriate creditor is determined, Hoepa has special assignee liability provisions that make most assignees
also liable for all conduct and omissions of
the creditor, including but not limited to
Hoepa violations.59

" the prohibition on extending credit
without regard to the homeowner's
ability to pay the loan obligation,5 6 and
* the limits on use of proceeds to pay a
home improvement contractor.57

3. Hoepa Remedies
A Hoepa violation gives the homeowner
most of the same remedies that are available in any TILA case, including actual
damages, attorney fees, and a statutory
penalty of $?oo to $2,oo0.5 8 Hoepa provides an important remedy of "an amount
equal to the sum of all finance charges
and fees paid by the consumer, unless the
creditor demonstrates that the failure to
comply is not material." 5 9 In some equity-stripping transactions, this remedy
makes it possible to recover money or
cancel indebtedness sufficient to allow
2. Hoepa Liability
Unless the acquirer is sophisticated the homeowner to recover lost equity or
enough to structure the transaction care- obtain legitimate refinancing or both. All
fully, a transaction that qualifies as a of these remedies are available only if the
Hoepa loan likely violates Hoepa. For homeowner files an action within the
foreclosed homeowners, Hoepa offers restricted limitation period of6 one year
of the violation. o
three types of protection: (1) additional from the date
disclosures beyond TIA requirements, The other important remedy available
(2) prohibited loan terms, and (3) prohi- under Hoepa is the right to rescind the
bitions on ancillary conduct related to loan. This right is available if the creditor
the loan.5 3 In equity- stripping cases the violated the disclosure and limitation
advocate should generally focus on
requirements in Section 226.32 but not
the conduct prohibitions in Section
54
* the additional disclosure requirements,
a26.34. 6While rescission is a powerful
" the prohibition against balloon pay- remedy, rescission in foreclosure reconments within the first five years,55
veyance transactions often presents the

51See supra I.B.2.b.3. In this situation the acquirer might be characterized as a mortgage broker for purposes of deeming the investor a creditor under Hoepa.

5215 U.S.C. § 1641(d) (1994). See

RENUART &

KEEST,
supra note 35, § 9.7.

5312 C.FR. §§ 226.32(c) (2001) (additional disclosures), 226.32(d) (loan terms), 226.34 (ancillary conduct).
5412 C.FR. §226.32(c) (2001). The face of the paperwork typically will establish whether the acquirer has complied with
these requirements.
55

1d. § 226.32(d)(1).

56

/d. § 226,34(a)(4). The language of this section includes "a presumption that a creditor has violated this paragraph
(a)(4) if the creditor engages in a pattern or practice of making loans subject to section 226 32 without verifying and documenting consumers' repayment ability." Many acquirers do not engage in any form of underwriting. The "pattern and
practice" requirement may be met by showing that the acquirer does not routinely collect
from foreclosed homeowners
any information about repayment ability.
57

1d. § 226.34(a)(1).

5815 U S.C. § 1640(a)(1), (2)(A), (3) (1995).
59
6 0

/d. § 1640(a)(4).
1d. § 1640(e). But see

RENUART & KEEST,
supra

6112 C.ER. §226.23(a)(3) n.48(2001), See

note 35, § 9.6. 1.

RENUART&

KEEST,
supra note 35, § 9 5.9
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difficult issue of how to tender the bal- 1. Framing the Problem
62
ance owed on the rescinded financing.
Part of an effective UDAP or commonlaw fraud argument is offering a context
4. TILA Violations and Remedies
for why this type of real estate transaction
The attorney for the foreclosed home- is unique and the deception egregious.
owner may also want to consider assert- Many judges instinctively look only at the
ing a TILA violation, especially if the face of the executed real estate docutransaction does not qualify as a Hoepa ments and dismiss a fraud or UDAP
loan or if rescission would be a useful claim. Framing the circumstances of the
remedy but is not available for the Hoepa transaction in compelling and sympaviolation. If the foreclosed homeowner thetic terms can establish that the equican prove that the transaction qualifies as ties lie in favor of the foreclosed homea Hoepa loan, then the acquirer or other owner and can help overcome judicial
potentially liable person is a "creditor" inclination not to look beyond the docufor all purposes under TILA and the loan ments. Factors to consider are the folis likely subiect to TILA disclosure lowing:
requirements. 6 3 A TILA violation gives

rise to a right of rescission with a three- mAcquirers Targeting Homeowners with
Equity. These deals are schemes that
year limitations period for the rescission
acquirers actively sell, not real estate
claim. 6 4 If Hoepa does not apply, the
transactions the homeowner seeks out.
foreclosed homeowner must establish
The acquirers usually seek out homethat the acquirer (or other person "to
owners with significant equity.
whom the obligation is initially payable")
meets the more difficult general TILA
* Emotional Distress of Foreclosed or
definition of a creditor who "regularly
Vulnerable Homeowners. In addition to
extends credit."65
severe financial distress, many foreclosed homeowners experience unusuC. State Unfair and Deceptive Acts
al emotional distress related to the parand Practices Laws
ticular home. It might be a family
To catalog the myriad misrepresentations
inheritance where the homeowners
that may occur during equity-stripping
raised or are raising their children and
schemes is impossible. For the more blafear appearing to be failures to their
tant scams, a common-law fraud or state
children. Homeowners might be the
unfair and deceptive acts and practices
first in their extended family to own
(UDAP) claim is obvious, such as when the
property. People who are elderly, ill, or
acquirer tells the homeowner to sign
mentally disabled have been dispropaperwork in order to "start the refinancportionately victimized by these
ing," but actually obtains and records a
schemes.
deed, and the homeowner is unaware of no
longer being the record owner of the * Trust. Acquirers often consciously crehome. 6 6 In many reconveyance schemes,
ate and then misuse a sense of trust to
however, the deception is palpable but diftake advantage of the homeowner. This
ficult to articulate. In this section I briefly
is especially relevant when the case
cover (1)framing the problem, (2)cominvolves affinity marketing, such as
mon misrepresentations and deceptive
appeals based on shared faith or race.
schemes, and (3) the defense of contrary
Some acquirers also routinely tell
written documents.67
homeowners that they once faced fore62

See

RENUART
& KEEST,supra

note 35, § 6.8.

6315 US.C. § 1602(f) (1994); 12 C.FR 226 2 (a) (17) n.3 (2001).
64 5 U.S.C. § 1635 (a), (f) (1995).
65

5See supra II.B. 1 d.(1).

66

See, e.g., Eitcher v Mid America Financial Investment Corporation, 702 N.W.2d 792, 804 (Neb 2005)

671n some jurisdictions, unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) laws do not cover real estate transactions. See
JONATHAN A SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVEAcTS AND PRACTICES§ 2 2 5 (6th ed 2004)
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closure and are offering the transaction
as a means of helping others facing
foreclosure.
" Complexity. These transactions are
complex even for many lawyers to
unravel. Foreclosed homeowners, may
be less sophisticated than the average
homeowner, and many are vulnerable
due to mental or physical incapacities.
* High -Pressureor Nonexistent Closing. Many
acquirers either fail to have a formal closing or conduct a closing with an affiliated
or friendly closer who supports the
acquirer's high-pressure tactics.

quence of the scheme is that the homeowner will lose all ownership interest
and be evicted. Some important information to demonstrate includes the
following: (1) the acquirer engaged in
no underwriting to determine whether
the homeowner had sufficient income
to make the monthly payments; (2) the
net effect of the deal was a monthly
payment that exceeded the amount the
homeowner had previously been
unable to pay; (3) the acquirer has
business plans or other information
aimed at investors that show an interest in gaining possession of the home;
(4) the number of deals the acquirer
has entered and the outcome of those
deals (e.g., few or no homeowners have
ever been able to repurchase their
homes from the acquirer); or (5) the
acquirer's alacrity in evicting a foreclosed homeowner 6who
is slightly
8
behind on payments.

" Aura of Sham Transaction. There often is
something repugnant about the process
that acquirers use to complete the deal.
For example, when the acquirer gets a
deed and promptly transfers the property
to an allied "investor" for a higher price,
one can call this a "strip and flip." How
such an acquirer posed as a rescuer but
intended only to take advantage of a * "Guaranteed Refinancing." Often the
acquirer falsely promises to the foredistressed homeowner is worth
closed homeowner that the acquirer
describing to the court. That the
will later provide or arrange the refiacquirer learned the approach at a getnancing necessary to complete a
rich-quick seminar, that the initial
reconveyance.
introduction to the acquirer was a
hard-sell door-to-door solicitation,
* "Runningthe Clock" Refinance. Acquirers
that the acquirer used a sham mortgage
often suggest that they are arranging a
to take title, or that the acquirer
refinancing and then stall until the
assumed almost no risk are all facts
homeowner has no option but to enter
that can help frame the transaction in
into any sale-repurchase deal that is
terms sympathetic to the homeowner.
presented at the last minute. Evidence
that may support this claim includes
m Negative Effects on the Community.
instances where the acquirer (1) uses a
Taking advantage of foreclosed homecompany name that suggests expertise
owners can exacerbate the negative
in real estate financing (e.g., Smith
community effects from high forecloHome Finance Corporation); (2)
sure rates.
advertises the offer of refinancing
2. Common Representations
assistance in the newspaper or in the
or Arguments
initial solicitation materials; (3) uses a
The following misrepresentations or decepbusiness card that says "loan officer,"
tive schemes have been alleged in multiple
"loan consultant," or the like; or (4)
foreclosure equity- stripping cases:
tells the homeowner not to talk to the
mortgage company or anyone else.
S"'Save Your Home." This type of repre"Running -the -clock" also is a tactic
sentation can be found false, deceptive,
that
occurs in cooperative ventures
or misleading when the likely conse68

Traditional UDAP theories would apply to this claim, but so might a "false promise" common-law claim (or a statutory claim for states with a "consumer fraud act" version of a UDAP statute). False promise can be especially appropriate
where the acquirer repeatedly makes false promises in the course of one or several transactions. See, e g., Motorola Corp.
v. Uzan, 274 F Supp. 2d 481 (SD.NY. 2003); Chedick v Nash, 151 F3d 1077, 1081 (D.C Cir. 1998) (fraud by making a
promise with lack of present intent to perform). Evidence of similar conduct can be admissible to prove intent. See
Johnson v United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092-99 (D.C. 1996).
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between acquirers and mortgage brokers who are paid for referrals. When
the acquirer offers compensation in
excess of that earned normally by a
mortgage broker, the broker has an
incentive to let the homeowner believe
that refinancing is proceeding and then
to switch to the acquirer's foreclosure
reconveyance offer when the redemption period is nearing the end and the
homeowner has little or no choice.
* "Repurchase" Really a Lease (with or
Without Option). Acquirers may represent that they will obtain refinancing
for homeowners or help homeowners
retain ownership but then turn the
homeowners into renters in their own
homes. Advocates can build a persuasive UDAP claim centered on the facts
that the acquirer's representations led
the homeowners to believe that they
would retain ownership and the actual
deal deprived them of ownership
(except perhaps for an option to purchase). 6 9 This argument can be presented as an alternative theory to an
equitable mortgage claim that the
transaction is in substance a loan.

deceptive, or misleading statements
about (1) the amount of monthly payments due under a sale-repurchase (or
leaseback); (2) the acquirer's assistance
to other homeowners in foreclosure: (3)
the qualifications or certifications of the
acquirer; (4) the purpose or effect of the
documents in the transaction; (5) the
contents of the documents in the transaction (e.g., blank spaces filled in by the
acquirer or a false statement that the
homeowner is not in possession of the
property); (6) the amount or uses of the
money distributed to or for the alleged
benefit of the homeowner at closing
(including false and misleading statements for the purpose of inducing the
homeowner to endorse closing proceeds
to or for the benefit of the acquirer); and
(7) the amount or nature of the fees in the
transaction.

Oral Misrepresentations Contrary
to Written Terms
The most likely defense in foreclosure
equity-stripping cases is that the acquirer
properly obtained and is following the
terms of written contracts with the homeowner. Oral misrepresentations can be
actionable, courts have repeatedly held,
" Sham Mortgages. Many acquirers obtain
under state UDAP statutes in the face of
title to the property at the end of the
contrary written representations even
redemption period by creating a sham
when this defense operates to preclude a
mortgage, often $5o or $1oo, with the
common-law fraud claim. 70 The Nebraska
acquirer as the mortgagee. Possible
Supreme Court rejected this defense in a
UDAP claims related to these mortforeclosure equity-stripping case. 7 '
gages include claims that (i) the
acquirer misrepresented to the homeowner the purpose and effect of the Ill. Other Possible Claims Against
Parties Participating in the
mortgage (e.g., stating that "this is to
Equity-Stripping Transaction
start your refinancing"); () the consideration for the mortgage was never Because of the wide variations in foreclopaid; and (3) the sham mortgage was
sure equity- stripping schemes, the numsigned along with other papers pre- ber of other possible
claims is nearly
sented to the homeowner and never endless. Below are brief descriptions
of
identified as such or explained.
claims worth considering. Each has been
* Other Claims. Among the multitude of asserted in at least one foreclosure equiother possible UDAP claims are false, ty-stripping case.72
3.

69

A related allegation might be that the acquirer promised a repurchase option but failed to deliver the option in the actual
transaction documents or that the acquirer offered an option to repurchase but on different and less favorable terms
70

Weigand v Walser, 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004), see generally SHELDON& CARTER,supra note 67, §§ 4 2 15 2.

4.2 15 4 (collecting cases).
71

Eicher, 702 N.W2d at 804.

72

Other legal theories that are not discussed in this section and may be of relevance include federal or state RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); common-law civil conspiracy; joint venture, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and common-law claims (some of ancient origin) related to the execution of the deed
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A. Statutory Claims

owner if proceeds from resale exceed a
certain amount; and representing that
Advocates should consider five possible
the foreclosure purchaser is helping to
statutory claims, federal and state, "save the house" or making substantially
depending on the facts of the case, state
similarly representations. 76
law, and the client's needs.
Older state statutes exist in California,
Georgia, and Missouri. Minnesota and
1. State Foreclosure
Missouri modeled the foreclosure-conEquity-Stripping Laws
Of course, consider an action under state sultant portions of their laws on California's
law if you are in a state that has a law deal- regulation of foreclosure consultants.
ing expressly with foreclosure consulting California also regulates "equity puror foreclosure purchasing. Two states, chasers." 7 7 The California equity purchaser
Minnesota and Maryland, recently statute primarily governs contract formaenacted similar laws directly addressing tion, but it also shifts the burden of proof in
the problems presented by foreclosure favor of finding an equitable mortgage
equity stripping.73 These laws compre- whenever there is a foreclosure reconhensively regulate both "foreclosure veyance transaction.7 8 Although its
consultants' and "foreclosure pur- approach is less comprehensive, Georgia
chasers." A foreclosure consultant under has incorporated into its state UDAP law
these laws is a person who offers services, provisions similar to those regulating equiclaims the ability to assist in stopping ty purchasers in California.79 Missouri, by
foreclosure, or makes any of a variety of contrast, has a law with provisions similar
to the foreclosure consultant portion of
similar representations.74
8
California law. o
The foreclosure purchaser provisions of
the Minnesota and Maryland laws aim 2. Unlicensed Real Estate or
Mortgage Origination Activity
directly at foreclosure reconveyance
schemes and define a "foreclosure pur- An acquirer or associated parties often lack
chaser" as a person who engages in fore- the real estate or mortgage originator licenclosure reconveyance transactions.75 sure required to complete the regulated
81
This unliAmong many other requirements and aspects of the transactions.
proscriptions, the laws prohibit the fore- censed conduct may give rise to a claim for
closure purchaser from the following: violation of the statute8or might constitute a
entering transactions in which the fore- per se UDAP violation.
closed homeowner does not have a "'reaIf the acquirer or other defendant is
sonable ability to pay" for the recon- licensed, the advocate for the foreclosed
veyance; failing either to reconvey the
homeowner may consider the following:
property or to pay the foreclosed home(1) an action under the licensure statute
73

MINN. STAT.§ 325N (2004); MD. CODEANN., REALPROP.§§ 7-301 to 7-321 (2005). I must note here that I was substantially involved in drafting and lobbying for passage of the Minnesota law.
74

75

76

7 7

78

79
80
81

MINN. STAT.§
MINN

STAT.

325N01 (2004); MD CODEANN.,

§ 325N.10, subdiv. 4 (2004);

MINN. STAT,§§
CAL.

REALPROP.
§ 7-301(b)

MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §

(2005).

325N.1 7(a)(a), (b), (d)(3) (2004); MD.

7-301(e) (2005).

CODEANN., REALPROP.§§ 7-31 1(b)(1)(i), (b)(2), (b)(4)(iii) (2005).

CIV.CODE §§ 2945-2945.11 (foreclosure consultants), 1695-1695.17 (equity purchasers) (2005).

CAL, CIV. CODE§

1695.12 (2005).

GA. CODEANN. § 10-1-393(b)(20)(A) (2005),
Mo.

ANN. STAT.

§§ 407,935-.943 (2005).

Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor Relationships And Responsibilities. The Failure of State Regulatory

Responses, 40

65
ONLEGISLATION
HARVARD
JOURNAL

(Winter 2003) (noting that every state had a real estate licensing scheme

by the end of the 1970s),
82

See, eg., Seligman v First National Investment Incorporated, 540 N E.2d 1057, 1064 (111,
App 3d Div. 1989) See genSHELDON
& CARTER,supra note 67, § 3 2,

erally

Clearinchouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy

*

March-April 2006

Foreclosure Equity Stripping

or for a per se UDAP violation based on acquirers are not licensed lenders and
violation of the prohibitions or required thus may be subject to the 8stricter rate
conduct in the statute; (2) reporting the limits of general usury laws. 9
conduct to the licensing regulator; or (3)
5. Real Estate Settlement
determining if a recovery fund exists
Procedures Act Antikickback
through which to satisf any judgment
Acquirers
often have various affiliates,
obtained in the action. t
such as mortgage brokers, to whom they
3, Credit Services and
make payments that could be characterized as compensation for referrals rather
Credit Repair Legislation
Acquirers often represent that their than services. Such payments might give
"services" or proposed actions help rise to an antikickback claim under the
improve or at least avoid further deterio- Real Estate Settlement Procedures
ration in the homeowner's credit rating. Act.9' Unlike some other parts of the
Such claims may be actionable under the statute, the antikickback provision confederal Credit Repair Organizations Act fers a private right of action.91
or state credit services statutes. 8 4 An
advantage of these laws is the generally B. Common-Law Claims
substantial remedies and lengthy limita- The five common-law theories below
tion periods. 8 5
have been asserted in foreclosure equitystripping cases.
4. Usury
States typically allow regulated lenders to
charge a variety of rates, depending on
the lender and the nature of the transactions. 8 6 Most states also have some form
of general usury law, although the laws
vary tremendously in scope. 8 7 These
general usury statutes often cap rates at
much lower levels than they allow regulated lenders to charge. In Minnesota, for
example, the general usury statute caps
interest rates as low as 6 percent compared to rate limits of about 2o percent or
more for most regulated lenders. 8 8 In
foreclosure equity-stripping cases, many
83

See, e.g.,

1. Unconscionability
A consistent characteristic of many foreclosure equity-stripping deals is that even
carefully documented transactions appear
fundamentally unfair and shock the conscience. In these circumstances, advocates should consider claims of unconscionability. This equitable doctrine
requires consideration of the entire
course of conduct underlying the transaction, including the process by which the
parties entered into the deal and the terms
and effect of the bargain. 9 2 The doctrine

MINN. STAT.§ 82.43 (2004).

8415 U.S.C. §§ 1679-1679(j) (1996); for state statutes, see, e.g.,

plete listing of state credit repair statutes, see

OHIO

REV.CODE ANN. §§ 4712.01-.99 (2006). For a com-

ANTHONYRODRIGUEZ ETAL., FAIRCREDIT
REPORTING,
app.

B.3 (Supp. 2005 ed.).

8515 U.S.C. § 1679g (1994) sets out credit repair remedies; these include a full refund of the greater of amounts paid or
actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. State credit repair laws often have a right of rescission and incorporate UDAP remedies. SHELDON& CARTER, supra note 67, § 5.1.2.2.3. The Credit Repair Organizations Act has a five-year
limitation period; see 15 U.S.C. § 1679(i) (1996).
86

See generally ELIZABETH
RENUART
& KATHLEEN
KEEST,
THECOSTOFCREDIT.REGULATION,
PREEMPTION
ANDINDUSTRY
ABUSES
ch. 9 (3d
ed. 2005).
87

Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAULBUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL
LAW

JOURNAL 85,

90-91 (2002) (stating that the typical elements of a usury claim are "(1) an agreement to lend money; (2) the
borrower's absolute obligation to repay with repayment not contingent on any other event or circumstance; (3) a greater
compensation for making the loan than is allowed under a usury statute or the State Constitution; and (4) an intention
to take more for the loan of the money than the law allows").
88

Compare MINN. STAT.§ 334.01 (2004) and MINN. STAT.§ 47.59, subdiv. 3 (2004).

89

See, e.g., Browner v District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1107 (D.C. 1988) (upholding criminal usury conviction for foreclosure equity scam).
9012 U.S.C. § 2607 (2003).
91

1d.§ 2614.

92

See generally

RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

208 (1981).
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has been successfully used by homeown3
ers in mortgage transactions. 9
Most courts look at unconscionable conduct in two parts: procedural and substantive. Procedural unconscionability
focuses on the relative bargaining power
and fairness of the bargaining process,
while substantive unconscionability
refers primarily to the reasonableness of
the ultimate terms of the contract. 9 4
Most courts require a finding of unconscionability in both parts, although some
courts use a more flexible determination
based on either part or a combination of
the two. 9 5 Advocates for foreclosed
homeowners should also consider the
related doctrines of good faith and fair
dealing and contend that the agreement
6
is void as a violation of public policy.9
The factors that courts often use to
evaluate an unconscionability
claim include gross disparity in
the values exchanged ... ; belief by

the stronger party that there is no
reasonable probability that the
weaker party will fully perform
the contract; knowledge of the
stronger party that the weaker
party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract;
knowledge of the stronger party
that the weaker party is unable
reasonably to protect his interests
by reason of physical or mental

infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy
or inability to understand the language of the agreement, or similar
factors.97
These factors obviously favor many foreclosed homeowners who assert unconscionability. In particular, more difficult
foreclosure reconveyance cases often present the second factor listed above-that the
acquirer knows that the foreclosed homeowner has no reasonable probability of performing on the contract.
InBrantleyv. GrantHoldings a federal district court enjoined eviction of a homeowner and found a likelihood that the
homeowner would prevail on an unconscionability claim in a failed reconveyance deal.9 8 The court concluded:
[A] desperate, ill informed and
poorly represented owner, led to
believe she is on the brink of
homelessness, cannot be said to
have freely entered into an
agreement that was entirely one sided, offered her no reasonable
hope of successful performance
and at the same time deprived
her of her equitable and statutory rights of redemption. 9 9
2. Unjust Enrichment
The elements of an unjust enrichment
claim also can vary by state but generally
are "(1) at plaintiffs expense (2)defen-

93

Family Financial Services Incorporated v Spencer 677 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) Patterson v ITT Consumer
Financial Corporation, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Williams v Aetna Financial
Company, 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998); Williams v First Government Mortgage and Investors Corporation, 974 F.Supp.
17 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd in part and remanded in part by 225 F3d 738 (D.C, Cir. 2000).
94For a general discussion and starting point distinguishing the concepts of procedural and substantive unconscionability, see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 208-33 (4th ed. 1995).
95

See Maxwell v Fidelity Financial Services Incorporated, 907 P2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that under
A.R.S. § 47-2302, a claim of unconscionability can be established with a showing of substantive unconscionability alone,
especially in cases involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies."). But see Harris v Green Tree Financial
Corporation, 183. F3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing courts generally require both procedural and substantive unconsoonability before upholding a claim of unconscionability); see also Anderson v. Delta Funding Corporation, 316 F Supp.
2d 554 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (finding procedural unconscionability alone insufficient to invalidate a clause on the basis of
unconscionability).
96

See RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF PROPERTY(MORTGAGES) § 6.2 (1997) (citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)). But
see Barasso v Rear Still Hill Road Limited Liability Company 81 Conn. App 798, 807 n.5 (Conn. App. 2004). (noting that
"special defenses and counterclaims alleging a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing .. are not
equitable defenses to a mortgage foreclosure" (internal quotation marks omitted)),
9 7

98
99

RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

208 cmts. c-d (1981).

Brantley v Grant Holdings, No. 03-6098 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2003) (order granting preliminary injunction)
/d. at 17.
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dant received benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for
defendant to retain benefit without paying for it." 1 0 0 Often misunderstood,
unjust enrichment and restitution are
synonymous and constitute a legal theory
of liability, not merely a remedy. The law
of unjust enrichment is designed for situations in which a party takes a benefit
without legal right and yet the aggrieved
party has no remedy at law.1 0 1 This can
be an excellent description of the events
experienced by a homeowner in an equity- stripping case.

5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
As noted previously, acquirers have
claimed special expertise in dealing with
complex foreclosure problems and also
have attempted to elicit trust by the fore closed homeowners. Advocates may
establish that the acquirer's sales representations create a fiduciary duty by the
acquirer to the foreclosed homeowner.

Foreclosure equity stripping is not new, but
it appears to be on the rise as a result of
soaring home values coupled with continued high foreclosure rates. Generalizing
3. Breach of Contract
about appropriate legal theories for comReconveyance transactions can be based bating the
problem is difficult because of
on elaborate written contracts. Simple wide variations in how
the schemes are
breach of contract is a possible claim
conducted. Many cases involve simple
especially when the acquirer has drafted
fraud. More often, the homeowner knowa contract specifying all the terms of the
ingly enters into a transaction structured as
reconveyance deal. These contracts can
a foreclosure reconveyance. In these cases
be unusually complex, or just obtuse, and
the practitioner should first determine if a
this makes it more likely that the acquirstate law regulates these transactions. Next
er has committed a material breach.
the practitioner should consider three legal
Contract ambiguities, of course, will be
theories most commonly used in these
construed against the acquirer as drafter
cases: equitable mortgage doctrine; Hoepa;
of the agreement.
and UDAP laws. Numerous other theories
also may be useful depending on the facts of
4. Title Claims: Declaratory
the case and the needs of the homeowner.
Judgment; Quiet Title;
Slander of Title; Injunctive Relief;
Constructive Trust
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